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Article
Can People Judge the Veracity
of Their Intuitions?
Stefan Leach1 and Mario Weick1
Abstract
People differ in the belief that their intuitions produce good decision outcomes. In the present research, we sought to test the
validity of these beliefs by comparing individuals’ self-reports with measures of actual intuition performance in a standard implicit
learning task, exposing participants to seemingly random letter strings (Studies 1a–b) and social media profile pictures (Study 2)
that conformed to an underlying rule or grammar. A meta-analysis synthesizing the present data (N¼ 400) and secondary data by
Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman found that people’s enduring beliefs in their intuitions were not reflective of actual performance in the
implicit learning task. Meanwhile, task-specific confidence in intuition bore no sizable relation with implicit learning performance,
but the observed data favoured neither the null hypothesis nor the alternative hypothesis. Together, the present findings suggest
that people’s ability to judge the veracity of their intuitions may be limited.
Keywords
intuition, implicit learning, metacognition, meta-analysis
The British TV series Luther centers on DCI John Luther, a
troubled detective working in a serious crime unit, who thanks
to his superior intuition prowess, solves difficult cases, often
finding himself operating at the fringes of the law (or beyond).
Luther’s defiance and brute confidence is a defining feature of
the character, but his religious reliance on instincts is reminis-
cent of many detective stories. For viewers or readers of such
stories, it seems plausible enough that some individuals
endowed with superior instincts know to trust their intuitions,
perhaps encouraged by the steady recurrence of confirmatory
outcomes—murderers getting caught and cases getting solved.
However, moving beyond the realm of fiction and super
instincts, the question arises whether in the absence of perfor-
mance feedback individuals have the introspective insight to
judge how good their intuitions are. In other words, do individ-
uals’ metacognitive representations of intuition performance—
how much certainty and confidence individuals express in their
intuitions—predict actual performance outcomes? The present
research addresses this question focusing on implicit learning
performance.
Dual process models presume that automatic processes give
rise to intuitive hunches or gut feelings (Chaiken & Trope,
1999; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans &
Frankish, 2009). Quick, intuitive judgments are often con-
trasted with slow, elaborate processes, with the latter producing
superior performance outcomes (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Devine,
1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Even when making decisions
under imperfect conditions that favor intuitive processes (see
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), people can lack the ability to
adequately scrutinize their judgments (Fiedler, 2000; see also
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Thus, individuals may lack an under-
standing of the, perhaps limited, veracity of intuitions (see
Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001).
However, some researchers have argued that people’s intui-
tive capabilities are often misrepresented in the literature and
less erroneous than one might assume (Bowers, Regehr,
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). For example, studies on impres-
sion formation show that people’s impressions of others are
often surprisingly accurate when formed on the basis of rela-
tively sparse information (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). There
is also evidence that individuals can monitor their performance
and correct for biases. For example, when asked to judge
whether a coin is biased in favor of heads or tails, people focus
on the proportion of heads in the sample and then correct for the
overall sample size (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Other work demonstrates that people can
readily adjust inferences drawn from intuitive feelings through
associative learning (Unkelbach, 2007) or logic (Winkielman,
Schwarz, & Belli, 1998).
People are relatively apt at extracting information from their
gut feelings (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby, 1990), including
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information on the goodness or fit of mental processes (Whit-
tlesea & Dorken, 1997). People can also readily express their
preference for, and endorsement of, intuitions in self-report
measures (Betsch, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein,
1999). One finding that emerges from studies using these mea-
sures is that people who consider themselves to be more intui-
tive (as opposed to rational) also tend to believe that their
intuitions lead to good decision outcomes and have predictive
validity (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). However, thus far the valid-
ity of these claims has mainly been examined in tasks geared
toward producing biases or erroneous decisions (Epstein
et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi,
2002). Arguably, such tasks are ill-suited to validate individu-
als’ explicit beliefs of intuition performance.
Some clues as to the link between individuals’ explicit
beliefs and actual intuition performance may derive from work
on the feeling of knowing, first studied in the context of
episodic memory (Blake, 1973; Hart, 1967; Schacter, 1983).
Metcalfe (1986) found that individuals were unable to judge
their ability to solve “insight” problems in the future. Metcalfe
reasoned these results could be due to the fact that the tasks at
hand required sudden illumination, and it may be particularly
difficult for individuals to predict Eureka-type phenomena.
Implicit learning tasks may provide a better outlet to probe
individuals’ intuition performance and associated beliefs. In an
implicit learning task, participants witness systematic associa-
tions between stimuli, often under disguise, and participants’
knowledge of the associative pattern is tested at a later stage.
The tasks are designed so as to render the extraction of patterns
or rules very difficult and too burdensome for slow, conscious
processes. Knowledge of the rules is therefore assumed to be
acquired implicitly (via System 1, see Kahneman, 2003), and
intuitions are thought to give individuals “vague feelings” of
the acquired knowledge (Reber, 1989, p. 233). Using the arti-
ficial grammar (AG) task (Reber, 1967), a standard implicit
learning task that involves learning rules related to nonsensical
letter strings, Dienes and colleagues demonstrated that individ-
uals can judge their own test performance ex post facto
(Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Dienes & Seth,
2010). This suggests that individuals may be able to judge the
veracity of their intuitions (i.e., whether their feelings translate
into correct answers). For example, stronger or more concrete
feelings may give individuals greater confidence that their
intuitions are correct.
However, responses in the AG task are not solely based on
intuitions and instead derive from a mix of implicit and explicit
knowledge (see Dienes, Broadbent, & Berry, 1991). Thus,
explicit knowledge of some of the letter strings, but not feelings
associated with implicit processes, may have underpinned indi-
viduals’ performance judgments. Furthermore, evidence for
successful implicit learning can also be found even when indi-
viduals are tossing a mental coin (Dienes & Seth, 2010), pre-
sumably oblivious to the veracity of their intuitions. This
suggests some dissociation between individuals’ metacognitive
representations and intuition performance. In addition, asking
participants to judge the correctness of their answers in an
implicit learning task only provides an indirect measure of indi-
viduals’ explicit beliefs about their intuition performance. In
particular, people’s mental representations of task performance
may not encompass any “intuition” concepts.
Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman (2010) administered the AG task
and a probabilistic serial reaction time task (Schvaneveldt &
Gomez, 1998)—the two paradigms of choice to study implicit
learning (Shanks, 2005)—to a sample of participants who also
completed the rational–experiential inventory measuring indi-
vidual differences in the (self-proclaimed) propensity to trust
one’s intuition (see Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The authors found
that individuals who expressed greater trust in their
intuitions did not perform any better in the implicit learning
tasks, rCombined ¼ .13, 95% confidence interval (CI) ¼ [.08,
.31].1 This casts some doubt on people’s ability to judge how
good their intuitions are. However, the absence of an associa-
tion in a single sample (Nadj¼ 100) is not sufficient to establish
a null effect. Relatedly, the CI for the population parameter
encompasses a wide range of values, calling for further studies.
The Present Research
In the current research, we sought to shed light on the question
whether metacognitive representations of intuition perfor-
mance—howmuch certainty and confidence individuals express
in their intuitions—predict actual performance outcomes in an
implicit learning task. We extend previous work in at least three
ways. First, previous studies focused on implicit learning of non-
sensical stimuli (e.g., letter strings). People seem to be more
insightful, however, when relying on intuitions in social domains
(e.g., Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). Consequently, in the present
research, we probed the validity of individuals’ beliefs regarding
their intuition performance in tasks involving nonsocial (Studies
1a–b) and social stimuli (Study 2), thus providing a stronger test
of the validity of individuals’ beliefs.
Second, we employed both generalized trait measures and
task-specific state measures of how much faith individuals
placed in their intuitions. This is a critical addition because
the absence of an association between individuals’ beliefs and
actual performance can be readily attributed to a lack of spe-
cificity in the trait measures employed to predict performance
(see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Pachur & Spaar, 2015). We
sought to overcome this limitation by probing individuals’
confidence in their intuitions vis-a`-vis the specific task at
hand. In addition, in order to obtain a more complete picture
of participants’ performance and corresponding mental repre-
sentations, we included auxiliary self-report measures
(detailed below) to help elucidate participants’ involvement
with, and approach to, the task.
Finally, we extend the body of evidence currently available
by carrying out a meta-analytic synthesis of all primary and
secondary data to provide more precise estimates of the popu-
lation parameters. Where applicable, we supplement our anal-
ysis with Bayes factor (BF01) calculations (e.g., Dienes, 2014).
Following Rouder and Morey (2012), our null hypothesis cor-
responds to a nil point (r ¼ 0) and the alternative hypothesis to
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a full range of positive and negative effects that follow a Cau-
chy distribution (see also Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, &
Iverson, 2009). We report BF01 for all nonsignificant effects
(yielded using a frequentist approach) to specify the chances that
the observed data occurred under the null hypothesis rather than
the alternative hypothesis; values larger than 3 provide evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis (e.g., Dienes, 2014). Note that a
decision to favor the null hypothesis implies that a nil effect pro-
vides a better approximation than the alternative hypothesis, but it
should not be taken as evidence that an effect is strictly zero in the
population, which is implausible (Cohen, 1994). Also note that
relative to a null hypothesis with an interval around zero, a null
hypothesis with a nil point favors the alternative hypothesis and
is therefore amore conservative approach to provide evidence for
invariance (seeMorey&Rouder, 2011; see also Lakens, in press,
for a frequentist approach).
Method
Participants
One hundred and one students participated in Study 1a (87
female; MAge ¼ 20.40, SDAge ¼ 5.05), 77 students in Study 1b
(61 female;MAge ¼ 20.32, SDAge ¼ 4.34), and 222 students and
members of the public in Study 2 (170 female; MAge ¼ 24.48,
SDAge ¼ 9.36). We only considered responses from participants
who completed all sessions and all parts of the study (see Proce-
dure). Students (nTotal¼ 325) were recruited from a British Uni-
versity and took part in exchange for course credits. Members of
the public (nTotal ¼ 75) were recruited from the United States
and the United kingdom via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
and took part for a monetary incentive. The sample sizes of the
individual studies provided 80% power at a ¼ .05 to detect
effects ranging from |r| ¼ .19 (Study 2) to |r| ¼ .31 (Study 1b).
Procedure and Materials
Studies 1a and 1b were conducted longitudinally in two consec-
utive sessions. At Time 1, participants completed the individual
difference measures online. The implicit learning task was
administered at Time 2 and carried out online (Study 1a) or
in the laboratory under the supervision of an experimenter
(Study 1b). Time 1 and Time 2 took place at least 1 day apart.
Study 2 was conducted online within the same session, and the
individual difference measures preceded the implicit learning
task. Table S1 in the Supplementary Material provides an over-
view of all key variations between Studies 1a–b and 2.
Self-reported intuition. All three studies contained the English
version of the Preference for Intuition Scale (Betsch, 2008), a
9-item questionnaire that measures endorsement of intuitive
reasoning (e.g., “With most decisions, it makes sense to com-
pletely rely on your feelings”). Participants indicated their
answers on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree). In addition, participants in Study 1b com-
pleted the Faith in Intuition Scale (Epstein et al., 1996), a
12-item measure of preference for intuitive thought and
behavior (e.g., “I believe in trusting my hunches”). Participants
responded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (completely false)
to 5 (completely true). Finally, participants in Study 2 com-
pleted the experiential inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), a
20-item measure of the extent to which individuals engage
in, and excel at, experiential thinking (e.g., “I like to rely on
my intuitive impressions”; “I hardly ever go wrong when I lis-
ten to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer”). Participants
responded to all items on a 5-point scale from 1 (definitely not
true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself).
Implicit AG learning task. Participants in Studies 1a and 1b com-
pleted a standard version of the AG learning task described in
Abrams and Reber (1988) as a measure of implicit learning per-
formance. The task involved learning associations between
(nonsensical) letter strings that followed a rule or “grammar.”
Participants in Study 2 completed a new, adapted version of the
task that required participants to learn associations between
profile pictures that are commonly used in online social media.
The same finite-state grammar was used to dictate the order of
the letter strings and the profile pictures (see Figure 1). In other
words, the two versions of the AG learning task were almost
identical, except that one version employed nonsocial stimuli
(letter strings) and another version employed social stimuli
(profile pictures). Performance was measured by the total num-
ber of correct responses, bound at 0 (minimum) and 46 (max-
imum), with scores above 23 indicating above-chance
performance. A more detailed description of the task can be
found in the Supplementary Material.
Task-related self-report measures. After the implicit learning
task, participants’ beliefs were probed with regard to (a) their
confidence in their intuitions (e.g., “To what extent did your
gut feeling give you certainty in your answers?”), (b) their
self-assessed performance (e.g., “How correct do you think are
your answers?”), (c) their use of intuition as a basis for their
decisions (e.g., “To what extent did you rely on your gut feel-
ings to decide whether a string [Online Chat post] was gramma-
tically correct or incorrect?”), and (d) the perceived benefits of
further information about the underlying grammatical rule
(e.g., “To what extent would reading further information on the
rules that governed the order of posts been beneficial to per-
form well on the task?”). All constructs were measured with
2 items, except for the confidence in intuition measure in Study
2, where a third item was added as a safeguard to avoid a
(hypothetical) situation where this key measure had low relia-
bility. In addition, some minor changes were made to the word-
ing of other auxiliary measures that yielded low reliability in
Study 1b (see Supplementary Material—Data Preparation). In
Study 1a, participants also indicated how much effort they
invested in the learning task (“How much effort did you invest
throughout the questionnaire to provide correct answers?”; sin-
gle item measure). A similar, 2-item measure was used in Study
2 (“How much effort did you invest in the Online Chat task?”;
“How much did you try to perform well in the Online Chat
task?”). Study 1b was conducted in a controlled laboratory
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environment, which enabled us to use the amount of time par-
ticipants spent on the practice and test phase of the AG task as
an objective indicator of effort. All self-report responses were
made on 9-point scales (see Supplementary Material).
Results
In our presentation of the results below, we take a cumulative
approach (see Cumming, 2014) and use meta-analytic proce-
dures to identify trends that generalize across studies, drawing
on both primary (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2) and secondary (Pretz,
Totz, & Kaufman, 2010) data wherever applicable. Since some
variations in population parameters are to be expected between
the different versions of the AG learning task (nonsocial vs.
social) and the different modes of assessment (laboratory vs.
online; longitudinal vs. single session), we employ random-
effects meta-analysis models to derive the estimates of central
tendencies (see Higgins & Green, 2011, Chapter 9).
Data Preparation
A description of the data preparation is provided in the Supple-
mentary Material. Tables 1–3 display the reliabilities, descrip-
tive statistics, and single-order correlations for all measures.
CIs are provided in Tables S1–S3.
Implicit Learning Performance
Overall performance in the AG learning task was above chance
level in all studies, suggesting that participants learned the
Figure 1. Finite-state grammar underpinning the nonsocial (top panel) and social (bottom panel) version of the artificial grammar learning task
(adapted from Abrams & Reber, 1988). Rule conforming and rule nonconforming example stimuli are shown on the right.
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underlying rule, MCorrectStudy1a ¼ 27.50, SD ¼ 4.32, t(100) ¼
10.45, p < .001, d ¼ 2.09; MCorrectStudy1b ¼ 27.36, SD ¼
4.29, t(76) ¼ 8.93, p < .001, d ¼ 2.05; MCorrectStudy2 ¼ 31.50,
SD ¼ 4.36, t(221)¼ 29.07, p < .001, d ¼ 3.91.2 As anticipated,
performance was enhanced in the social version of the AG
learning task compared to the nonsocial version of task, Zs 
4.20, ps < .001. This also held when restricting the samples
to participants drawn from the same population, Zs  3.96,
ps < .001. As can be seen in Tables 1–3, implicit learning per-
formance shared no sizable relationship with subjective (Stud-
ies 1a and 2) and objective (Study 1b) effort, suggesting that
more deliberative approaches to the task were not beneficial,
Table 1. Internal Consistency, Means, Standard Deviations (SDs), and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures in Study 1a.a
Measure 1 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 4
1 Preference for intuition (.78) .13 .07 .06 .06 .02 .24*
2a Confidence in intuition — (.78) .59** .31** .03 .24* .23*
2b Self-assessed performance — — (.91) .08 .04 .14 .28*
2c Use of intuition — — — (.73) .06 .22* .13
2d Benefits of further information — — — — (.59) .25* .01
3 Subjective effort — — — — — — .05
4 AG learning performance — — — — — — —
Mean 4.82 4.41 4.29 7.33 6.88 7.02 27.50
SD 0.77 2.14 1.89 1.63 1.74 1.40 4.32
Note. AG ¼ artificial grammar.
aValues in parentheses are reliability estimates (so standardized and equivalent to effect sizes) and do not necessitate p values.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 2. Internal Consistency, Means, Standard Deviations (SDs), and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures in Study 1b.a
Measure 1a 1b 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 4
1a Preference for intuition (.74) .58** .23* .11 .12 .04 .12 .06
1b Faith in intuition — (.74) .27* .12 .01 .13 .15 .23*
2a Confidence in intuition — — (.70) .32** .21 .05 .15 .10
2b Self-assessed performance — — — (.70) .17 .02 .03 .09
2c Use of intuition — — — — (.38) .09 .04 .15
2d Benefits of further information — — — — — (.44) .05 .04
3 Objective effort — — — — — — — .08
4 AG learning performance — — — — — — — —
Mean 4.72 3.50 4.66 5.00 7.03 7.37 3.63 27.36
SD 0.72 0.48 1.84 1.72 1.52 1.55 1.09 4.29
Note. AG ¼ artificial grammar.
aValues in parentheses are reliability estimates (so standardized and equivalent to effect sizes) and do not necessitate p values.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 3. Internal Consistency, Means, Standard Deviations (SDs), and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures in Study 2.a
Measure 1a 1b 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 4
1a Preference for intuition (.79) .71** .32** .04 .19** .13 .02 .01
1b Experiential inventory — (.88) .36** .09 .25** .09 .12 .05
2a Confidence in intuition — — (.90) .52** .32** .10 .16* .10
2b Self-assessed performance — — — (.84) .14* .01 .23** .27**
2c Use of intuition — — — — (.62) .00 .25** .06
2d Benefits of further information — — — — — (.73) .05 .02
3 Subjective effort — — — — — — (.77) .11
4 Social AG learning performance — — — — — — — —
Mean 4.71 3.38 5.33 5.46 6.78 5.56 7.86 31.50
SD 0.84 0.52 1.84 1.70 1.49 2.41 1.30 4.36
Note. AG ¼ artificial grammar.
aValues in parentheses are reliability estimates (so standardized and equivalent to effect sizes) and do not necessitate p values.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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rCombined¼ .04, n¼ 400, 95% CI [.10, .18], Q¼ 2.06, df¼ 2,
BF01 ¼ 6.64. The BF01 suggests that the observed data are 6.64
times more likely to occur under the null hypothesis than under
the alternative hypothesis, thus supporting the assumption of
invariance (e.g., Dienes, 2014).
Beliefs in intuition. As shown in Figure 2, across studies we found
little evidence that dispositional trust in intuition translated into
superior learning performance. A meta-analysis of all primary
(Studies 1a–b and 2) and secondary (Pretz et al., 2010) data indi-
cates that there was no sizable association between dispositional
intuition endorsement (i.e., Preference for Intuition, Faith in
Intuition, Experiential Inventory) and implicit learning perfor-
mance, rCombined ¼ .05, n ¼ 500, 95% CI [.17, .08], Q ¼
9.37, df ¼ 5, BF01 ¼ 6.02. Interestingly, the more participants
placed trust in their intuitions, the worse they performed in the
nonsocial version of the AG learning task (Studies 1a–b),
rCombined ¼ .20, n ¼ 178, 95% CI [.34, .06], Q ¼ .94, df
¼ 2. Meanwhile, performance in the social version of the AG
learning task (Study 2) bore no sizable relation with intuition
endorsement, rCombined ¼ .02, n ¼ 222, 95% CI [.11, .15],
BF01 ¼ 6.55. These variations between studies (i.e., Studies
1a–b vs. Study 2) employing different versions of the same
AG learning task (i.e., social vs. nonsocial) were significant, Z
¼ 2.26, p ¼ .024.
Self-assessed performance correlated with actual performance
on the AG learning task, rCombined ¼ .24, n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.14,
.33], Q ¼ 2.17, df ¼ 2, replicating Dienes and colleagues’ find-
ings (Dienes et al., 1995; Dienes & Seth, 2010; see Tables 1–3).
However, as shown in Figure 3, there was no evidence that task-
specific confidence in intuition was related to actual performance
across studies, rCombined¼ .09, n¼ 400, 95% CI [.07, .24],Q¼
4.64, df ¼ 2, BF01 ¼ 2.17. The BF01 is below 3, suggesting that
there is insufficient evidence to favor the null hypothesis over the
alternative hypothesis. Consequently, we must entertain the pos-
sibility that confidence in one’s intuitions vis-a`-vis the specific
task provides an indication of actual intuition performance. How-
ever, as shown by the CI (r¼ .09 [.07, .24]), in a given sample,
the predictive validity can be expected to be low (r .10) and is
unlikely to exceed r  .25. We will return to the implications of
this finding in the Discussion.
Exploratory analyses. We conducted a series of exploratory anal-
yses in the hope to shed some further light onto the lack of an
association between people’s beliefs about their intuitions and
actual intuition performance. First, as indicated earlier, partici-
pants’ judgments of how well they did on the task may reflect,
at least in part, participants’ explicit knowledge related to the
conscious acquisition of some underlying rules, which
accounts for some (but not all) of the variation in performance
in the AG task. Consequently, controlling for participants’ self-
assessed performance statistically could be a way to discern
variations in task performance that can be attributed to implicit
processes. With this in mind, we regressed the AG learning task
scores on the measures of dispositional intuition endorsement
as well as participants’ self-assessed performance ratings. We
conducted three separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions, one for each study (Study 1a, Study 1b, and Study 2), and
then meta-analyzed the resulting semipartial correlation coeffi-
cients. In addition, we repeated the same procedure,
Figure 2. Forest plot and random effects meta-analysis of the correlations between dispositional intuition endorsement and implicit learning
performance. Observations denote pairwise comparisons. N is adjusted by dividing the number of participants in a given study by the number of
measures included in the meta-analysis that were administered to the same group of participants (see Higgins & Green, 2011, Chapter 16).
Figure 3. Forest plot and random effects meta-analysis of the correlations between task-specific confidence in intuition and implicit learning
performance.
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substituting the dispositional intuition endorsement variables
with the task-specific confidence in intuition measure. Control-
ling for participants’ self-assessed performance, the association
between dispositional intuition endorsement and implicit learn-
ing performance remained unaltered, srCombined ¼ .08, n ¼
400, 95% CI [.20, .05], Q ¼ 6.27, df ¼ 4, BF01 ¼ 2.63. Simi-
larly, task-specific confidence in intuition had no sizable rela-
tionship with actual performance, srCombined ¼ .03, n ¼ 400,
95% CI [.18, .11], Q ¼ 2.04, df ¼ 2, BF01 ¼ 7.60, this time
providing sufficient evidence to favor the null hypothesis.
People who were dispositionally inclined to place greater
faith in their intuitions did not invest different levels of effort
in the task, rCombined ¼ .01, n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.12, .13],
Q ¼ 2.82, df ¼ 4, BF01 ¼ 8.86, but they expressed greater con-
fidence in their intuitions in the AG learning task, rCombined ¼
.27, n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.14, .38], Q ¼ 3.69, df ¼ 4. To separate
the contributions of the more general, dispositional measures
and the more task-specific, state measures of intuition confi-
dence to implicit learning performance, we regressed the AG
learning task scores on the measures of dispositional intuition
endorsement (i.e., Preference for Intuition, Faith in Intuition,
Experiential Inventory) and the measure of task-specific confi-
dence in intuition. We conducted three OLS regressions, one
for each study, and then meta-analyzed the resulting partial
correlation coefficients.3 Neither dispositional nor task-
specific manifestations of intuition confidence bore a
significant relation with performance on the AG learning task;
dispositional: prCombined ¼ .09, n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.22, .04],
Q ¼ 8.41, df ¼ 4, BF01 ¼ 1.89; task-specific: prCombined ¼ .11,
n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.03, .26], Q ¼ 4.59, df ¼ 2, BF01 ¼ 0.87.
However, once again, the existence of a small positive
association between task-specific confidence in intuition and
intuition performance could not be ruled out.
We also sought to rule out that nongrammatical stimuli misled
participants’ intuitive judgments by examining participants’ per-
formance on trials involving grammatical stimuli only. Zero-
order correlations revealed that correct responses on grammatical
trials were neither related to dispositional intuition endorsement
(i.e., Preference for Intuition, Faith in Intuition, Experiential
Inventory), rCombined ¼ .07, n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.20, .06], Q
¼ 3.60, df ¼ 4, BF01 ¼ 3.51, nor to task-specific confidence in
intuition, rCombined ¼ .09, n ¼ 400, 95% CI [.05, .23], Q ¼
4.68, df ¼ 2, BF01 ¼ 1.89, although the latter measure provided
insufficient evidence to favor the null hypothesis.
Discussion
The current research examined how people’s beliefs about their
intuitions—how certain and confident people are in their intui-
tions—relate to actual intuition performance in a standard
implicit learning task. To this end, we exposed participants to
seemingly random letter strings (Studies 1a–b) or social media
profile pictures (Study 2) that conformed to an underlying rule
or grammar. Participants’ incidental learning of the rule was
then probed in a subsequent test phase. Pooling data from three
new studies (N ¼ 400) and, where applicable, previously
published work (Pretz et al., 2010), we found that people’s
enduring beliefs in their intuitions were a poor guide to actual
performance. In particular, people who were dispositionally
inclined to place greater trust in their intuitions did not perform
any better in the test phase of the implicit learning task than
people who did not place such great trust in their intuitions.
Further analyses suggested that this result cannot be attributed
to variations in explicit knowledge nor to the fact that partici-
pants were misled by nongrammatical/rule-nonconforming sti-
muli, nor to differences in (subjective and objective) effort.
It may not come as a complete surprise that measures that
tap into general dispositions fail to predict performance on a
specific task (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Pachur & Spaar,
2015). To address the issue of domain-specificity, we also
assessed task-specific confidence in intuition—a state mea-
sure of how confident and certain participants were in their
intuitions during the test phase of the implicit learning tasks.
The measure was administered after the implicit learning
tasks, thus ensuring a high degree of familiarity with the task.
In spite of these “favorable” conditions, pooled across studies
task-specific confidence in intuition did not predict actual
intuition performance. We also used statistical techniques to
separate the unique contributions of general and task-
specific beliefs in intuition to task performance. Once again,
no reliable associations were found. However, using a Baye-
sian approach to test for invariance (Rouder & Morey, 2012),
we could not affirm the null hypothesis.
It remains possible, and perhaps the most likely scenario, that
individuals’ confidence in their intuitions vis-a`-vis a task at hand
provides some indication of actual learning performance. How-
ever, as outlined above in a given sample, the predictive validity
can be expected to be low (r .10) and is unlikely to exceed r
.25. A relatively weak relationship with actual performance
implies that individuals’ task-specific beliefs in their intuitions
can be frequently misleading. This can be illustrated with
Rosenthal and Rubin’s (1982) binomial effect size display:
Assuming, for the sake of illustration, a dichotomous outcome
in the implicit learning task (correct judgments vs. incorrect
judgments) and a clear separation of participants into those with
high and low confidence, the difference in success between peo-
ple with high and low confidence in a given sample is unlikely to
exceed 25% (and equally likely to be zero). Put differently, 1 of
the 4 times individuals with high confidence in their intuitions
may perform better than individuals with low confidence in their
intuitions. Conversely, 3 of the 4 times high (vs. low) confidence
may not provide an indication of better performance (correct vs.
incorrect). Note that these figures illustrate a “best-case” sce-
nario; in a given sample, we would expect the difference
between people with high and low confidence to be *10%,
which would imply that 9 of the 10 times high (vs. low) confi-
dence does not translate into superior performance.
Limitations
The present findings are limited to implicit learning of novel
stimuli and should not be generalized to other facets of
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intuition, such as the intuitive decision-making of experts (e.g.,
Chase & Simon, 1973). Simon (1992) likened the expert intui-
tions to recognition, invoking memory-based processes of
matching and information retrieval. In contrast, the present
work placed an emphasis on information acquisition. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that studies on expert intuitions often
arrive at similar conclusions as the present research (cf.
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). Reviewing research on expert
intuitions, Kahneman and Klein (2009) concluded that
subjective confidence provides an “unreliable indication of the
validity of intuitive judgments and decisions” (p. 524).
On a related note, it is possible that individuals can calibrate
their mental representations of intuition performance through
feedback, and this may contribute to align individuals’ beliefs
with actual performance. However, external feedback can also
exacerbate biases and foster overconfidence and false beliefs
(Arkes, 2001; Fiedler, 2000; Hogarth, 2001). Further studies
are needed to gain a fuller and more complete understanding
if and under what conditions individuals are able to judge the
veracity of their intuitions.
Conclusions
People readily express their preference for, and endorsement
of, intuitions in self-report measures (Betsch, 2008; Epstein
et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).4 The more individuals
perceive themselves to be intuitive (as opposed to rational), the
more they tend to believe that their intuitions have predictive
validity and lead to good decision outcomes (Pacini & Epstein,
1999). When putting these assumptions to a test in an implicit
learning task, we found no evidence that individuals’ disposi-
tional trust in their intuitions was warranted. Furthermore,
while confidence in one’s intuitions vis-a`-vis a particular task
at hand may bear some relation to actual intuition performance,
the predictive validity is likely low and may lead to frequent
misjudgments.
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Notes
1. Pretz and colleagues observed correlations of r ¼ .040 and r ¼ .
198, respectively, for the two implicit learning tasks administered
to the same sample of participants (n ¼ 93 and 107, respectively).
We performed a fixed effects meta-analysis to combine the two
correlation coefficients, which did not differ, Z ¼ .38, p ¼ .354.
2. In Study 2, the two samples (students vs. public) performed simi-
larly on the task,Ms ¼ 31.31 versus 31.85, SDs ¼ 4.22 versus 4.61,
t(220) ¼ .87, p ¼ .383, and Bayes factor (BF01 [r ¼ 1.0] ¼ 6.25;
BF01 based on Rouder et al., 2009).
3. In all analyses presented here, substituting semipartial correla-
tions for partial correlations and vice versa yielded the same
results.
4. Several studies have reported an association between the Intuition-
Sensate dimension of the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI;
Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998) and performance
on different implicit learning tasks (Kaufman et al., 2010; Wool-
house & Bayne, 2000). However, the MBTI Scale measures indi-
viduals’ preference for abstract versus concrete thinking and does
not capture individuals’ beliefs regarding their intuitions (see Pretz
& Totz, 2007). The present research does not refute the possibility
that self-report measures of individual dispositions are predictive
of implicit learning performance.
Supplemental Material
The supplemental material is available in the online version of the
article.
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